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Non-technical summary:
The present paper studies the importance of employer-specific determinants in
escaping low earnings in Germany. In our empirical analysis, we draw particular
attention to the role of employer size and the nature of industrial relations. We
hypothesise employer size to have an ambiguous impact on low-wage mobility for
two reasons. On the one hand, employer size is typically viewed a good proxy for
the presence of internal job ladders, thereby promoting intra-firm wage mobility.
On the other hand, larger employer are likely to face a higher degree of information
asymmetries about workers’ true productivity, which may hamper intra-firm wage
growth. Industrial relations may be viewed as a potential means to overcome these
informational problems as, e.g., local worker representations are actively involved in
monitoring promotions and reducing information asymmetries concerning workers’
productivity levels.
Using data from a large-scale linked employer-employee panel data set, our find-
ings indicate that employer characteristics play an important role in helping workers
to escape their low pay status, though they point to different patterns across gender.
While for male workers from the service sector the probability of escaping low pay
tends to increase with employer size, female workers rather benefit from collective
bargaining coverage contracts and the presence of local works councils. While these
findings provide evidence that internal labour markets are an important ingredient
of male within-firm wage growth, they do not necessarily contradict the view that
internal labour markets may also exist for female low-wage workers. The only con-
clusion that can be inferred from our findings is that for females there are potential
countervailing effects of plant size which might arise from a larger degree of asym-
metric information. Along with the differences in the industrial relations effects this
leads us to conclude that the removal of asymmetric information appears to be more
relevant in explaining female workers’ wage transitions as compared with their male
counterparts. This finding is consistent with incomplete information about work-
ers’ true productivity being particularly relevant for individuals whose employment
careers are more frequently characterised by earlier career interruptions, making it
difficult to value their productivity based upon previous work performance.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze:
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Bedeutung von betriebsspezifischen Charak-
teristika fu¨r die Lohnmobilita¨t von Geringverdiener/innen. Besonderes Augenmerk
gilt hierbei der Wirkung der Betriebsgro¨ße sowie der industriellen Beziehungen auf
die Aufstiegschancen. Von der Betriebsgro¨ße sind zwei gegenla¨ufige Effekte auf
die Aufstiegswahrscheinlichkeit zu erwarten, so dass der Nettoeffekt a-priori unein-
deutig ist. Zum einen weisen gro¨ßere Arbeitgeber ha¨ufiger interne Arbeitsma¨rkte
auf, was die Aufstiegschancen positiv beeinflussen sollte. Zum anderen treten in
gro¨ßeren Betrieben eher Informationsprobleme im Hinblick auf die wahre Produk-
tivita¨t der Bescha¨ftigten auf, was im Gegenzug zu niedrigerer Lohnmobilita¨t fu¨hren
kann. Industrielle Beziehungen, insbesondere in Form von Betriebsra¨ten, ko¨nnen
diese Informationsprobleme aufgrund von Mitspracherechten bei der Befo¨rderungen
erheblich abmildern.
Insgesamt deuten die Ergebnisse auf Basis von deutschen Linked Employer-
Employee Daten darauf hin, dass die obigen Merkmale die Aufstiegswahrschein-
lichkeiten von Geringverdiener/innen signifikant beeinflussen. Hierbei ergeben sich
jedoch unterschiedliche Muster in Abha¨ngigkeit vom Geschlecht. So haben Ma¨nner
in gro¨ßeren Betrieben signifikant ho¨here Aufstiegschancen, profitieren jedoch nicht
von Betriebsra¨ten und Tarifvertra¨gen. Im Gegensatz hierzu profitieren Frauen ins-
besondere von der Existenz eines Betriebrates, jedoch nicht von der Betriebsgro¨ße.
Die Ergebnisse liefern somit Evidenz dafu¨r, dass interne Arbeitsma¨rkte eine wichtige
Determinante der Aufstiegschancen ma¨nnlicher Geringverdiener sind. Fu¨r Frauen
hingegen lassen sich hinsichtlich der Bedeutung interner Arbeitsma¨rkte keine ein-
deutigen Aussagen treffen. Hier lassen die Ergebnisse lediglich die Schlussfolgerung
zu, dass der gegenla¨ufige Effekt der Betriebsgro¨ße infolge der Existenz asymmetrischer
Information mo¨glichen positiven Effekten sta¨rker entgegenwirkt als bei ma¨nnlichen
Geringverdienern. In Kombination mit den unterschiedlichen Effekten der indus-
triellen Beziehungen la¨sst dies darauf schließen, dass asymmetrische Informationen
hinsichtlich der wahren Produktivita¨t fu¨r Frauen ein relevanteres Aufstiegshemmnis
darstellen als fu¨r Ma¨nner.
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transitions using a multivariate Probit model that accounts for selection into
low-wage employment and non-random employer drop-out. Using data from
the LIAB Linked Employer–Employee panel, our results indicate that for male
workers from the service sector the probability of escaping low-pay increases
with employer size. This contrasts with female workers from the service sec-
tor, who rather benefit from collective bargaining coverage and local works
councils. These findings are consistent with internal labour markets being an
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1 Introduction
Numerous papers have documented a widening in the wage and earnings distribution
especially in the U.S. and the U.K. over the last three decades (e.g. Acemoglu 2003,
Gosling et al. 2000, Levy and Murnane 1992). Yet, the degree of concern about wage
inequality generally depends on whether individual inequality is likely to persist over
the life-cycle. Therefore, in response to this evidence a literature has developed that
investigates the extent of individuals’ mobility through the wage distribution (e.g.
Buchinsky and Hunt 1999, Burkhauser et al. 1997, Dickens 2000). In this literature,
low-wage workers typically are of major interest to researchers. The reason is that a
high degree of low-pay persistence raises particular concerns about inequality as it
tends to marginalise low-wage workers in the long run. However, the degree of wage
mobility is not only relevant from a welfare perspective, but is also central to the
question of appropriate policy interventions. Wage subsidies, for example, intended
to complement low earnings are the more likely to succeed in rendering low-pay jobs
a stepping-stone into regular employment, the more mobile workers are in the wage
distribution.
The high degree of persistence in low-wage employment that is generally doc-
umented by raw descriptive statistics has led some researchers to inquire into the
sources of low-pay persistence (see e.g. Cappellari 2002, 2007, Stewart and Swaffield
1999). Their overall aim is to distinguish persistence in low pay due to observed and
unobserved heterogeneity from true state dependence. The latter is also referred
to as ”genuine state dependence” and may occur if low-wage employment today
causes low-wage employment in the future for reasons of stigmatization or human
capital depreciation. A central result that emerges from this literature is that the
extent of genuine state dependence is considerably reduced once observable charac-
teristics and selection into low-wage employment are accounted for. While much of
this literature has focused on individual characteristics, the role of employer char-
acteristics has received considerably less attention. Addressing the role of employer
characteristics is crucial to an understanding of low-wage dynamics for several rea-
sons. First, neglecting employer characteristics may equally well result in a biased
estimation of genuine state dependence if persistence in low pay is systematically
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associated with the characteristics of low-wage firms. Second, quantifying the role
of employer characteristics in promoting wage mobility is of vital importance for
policy recommendations aiming at reducing low-pay persistence. To the extent that
employer characteristics matter, active labour market policies, such as hiring subsi-
dies or activating programs for the unemployed, might be directly targeted to those
employers who have been identified as being conducive to mobility out of low-wage
employment.
The purpose of this paper is to fill in this gap by examining the importance of
employer-specific determinants in escaping low earnings in Germany. While the Ger-
man wage structure has long been considered relatively stable at lower percentiles
(Prasad 2004), the past two decades have seen a clear tendency towards more wage
inequality at the bottom end of the wage distribution (Dustmann et al. 2009, Kohn
2006). As a consequence, the low-wage sector has increasingly grown in importance.
In order to address the importance of employer characteristics, the evidence pre-
sented in this paper is based on a large-scale Linked Employer-Employee data set,
the Linked Employer-Employee Panel from the German Institute for Employment
Research (LIAB). The data provide a useful basis for exploring wage mobility for sev-
eral reasons. First, the data combine establishment-level data with administrative
information on individual wage records and characteristics for the entire population
of workers in the establishment sample. The establishment-level data offer a great
deal of information on establishment characteristics, such as establishment size, sec-
tor affiliation and the nature of industrial relations. Second, the individual data
provide information on workers’ employment (and earnings) status five years later,
enabling us to analyse the extent of wage mobility over this time span. A particular
strength of the individual data set is that it mitigates problems of panel attrition
that typically arise with survey data. In our data set, the problem of panel attri-
tion is considerably reduced as the data track individuals over time as long as they
are either employed or, alternatively, unemployed with transfer payments.1 Even
though our data feature less panel attrition than survey data, we still face the prob-
lem of non-random employer retention if individuals leave their employer and/or fall
1Note that this holds irrespective of whether the initially observed employer attrited in the IAB
Establishment Panel.
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out of the earnings distribution. Because this drop out is likely to be non-random,
we follow the approach of Cappellari and Jenkins (2006) and Cappellari (2007) by
estimating a trivariate probit model, which accounts for the selection into low-wage
employment and non-random employer retention.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
of related empirical work. Section 3 contains a discussion of the employer-specific
characteristics that may be expected to affect low-wage mobility. Section 4 presents
the empirical analysis. While Section 4.1 to 4.4 provide a description of the data
set and the estimation strategy, Section 4.5 present the empirical results. The final
Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous Research
Earlier studies seek to measure wage mobility by analysing transition matrices be-
tween different quantiles of the wage distribution. Studies of this sort include e.g.
Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) for the U.S., Cardoso (2006) for Portugal and the U.K.,
Dickens (2000) for the U.K. and Hofer and Weber (2002) for Austria. A principal
finding that emerges from this literature is that, while most of these countries wit-
nessed an increase in inequality, mobility tended to fall over the past three decades.
A further well documented empirical pattern is that there appears to be a great deal
of persistence particularly at the top and the bottom of the wage distribution. How-
ever, even though these studies often provide transitions that are broken down by
several observable characteristics, this strand of literature generally remains silent
about the mechanisms that lie behind the observed state dependence.
While the notion of genuine state dependence reflects the true causal effect of
low pay, a high degree of low-pay persistence need not necessarily indicate genuine
state dependence. Persistence in low pay may also result from adverse employer
and individual characteristics that may be either observed or unobserved in nature.
As a result, the central econometric challenge researchers are facing is that of unob-
served heterogeneity and initial conditions. A number of studies have addressed this
issue by adopting multi-variate probit models that account for several endogenous
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selection mechanisms. For example, Stewart and Swaffield (1999) and Cappellari
(2002) estimate bivariate probit models, in order to assess the endogeneity of the
initial earnings status. Cappellari (2007) takes this approach further by estimat-
ing a four-variate probit model that additionally accounts for the endogeneity of
schooling choices and earnings retention. The latter takes into account that unob-
servables affecting the probability of dropping out of the earnings distribution are
typically correlated with factors that determine the initial earnings status. Taken
together, the findings of these studies indicate that the impact of personal attributes
on remaining low paid are generally overstated if one ignores the endogeneity of the
initial low-wage status. Moreover, the results suggest that the extent of ”true” state
dependence is reduced by up to 50 percent once observable characteristics and the
selection mechanisms are accounted for.
While much of this literature has focused on the role of individual characteris-
tics in determining wage mobility, the role of employer characteristics has received
somewhat less attention. An exception is the study Holzer et al. (2004). Using
matched employer-employee data from Illinois, the authors find employer-specific
fixed-effects to be an important determinant of earnings mobility. As to employer
observables, this study and most of the analyses reviewed above control for sector
affiliation and firm size. By contrast, there are virtually no studies that address the
role of employer-specific labour market institutions, such as the existence of a works
council and a collective bargaining contract. As will be set out later, the nature
of industrial relations may be considered a relevant factor in determining workers’
chances of escaping low pay.
Further, there are very studies based on German data that address the issue
of wage mobility. An early study is that by Burkhauser et al. (1997), who com-
pare earnings mobility in the U.S. and Western Germany. Despite fundamentally
different labour market institutions, the authors find similar mobility rates among
German and U.S. workers.2 Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel
(SOEP), Uhlendorff (2006) analyses the relationship between low pay, high pay and
non-employment. Similar to other studies, the author finds the extent of genuine
2Some further studies look at (net) income mobility, which is not the focus of interest here, see
e.g. Hauser and Fabig (1999) and Jenkins and van Kerm (2006).
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state dependence to be considerably reduced once unobservable and observable het-
erogeneity is accounted for. While Uhlendorff (2006) finds individual characteristics,
such as age and education, to have an significant impact on low-pay persistence, his
study does not address the role of employer characteristics. The same is true for the
study by Gernandt (2009), who also uses data from the German SOEP and focuses
on the individual determinants of wage mobility. Using individual panel data from
the Employment Statistics in Germany, a recent study by Schank et al. (2009) ex-
plores low-wage mobility by estimating various probit models that account for some
employer characteristics. While these authors find that employer characteristics,
such as firm size significantly affect the probability of escaping low pay, they do
not address the question of whether their results are robust to the selection into
low-wage employment and non-random earnings retention. As noted before, this
is an issue of particular concern as the impact of observable attributes is generally
considerably reduced once these selection mechanisms are accounted for.
3 The Role of Employers for Low Pay Transitions
3.1 Theoretical Background
The theoretical literature on wage dynamics within firms has identified several fea-
tures that are considered important determinants of wage mobility inside firms:
Job assignment, on-the-job human capital acquisition and learning about workers’
unobserved productivity (Gibbons and Waldman 1999). Central to the idea of job
assignment is the notion that the assignment to different job levels takes place within
a hierarchical job structure based upon comparative advantage. The concept of hi-
erarchical job structures is closely related to the theory of internal labour markets
(Doeringer and Piore 1971). At the heart of this approach is the view that workers
are hired into entry-level jobs and that jobs at higher levels are filled by the promo-
tion of workers within the firm. In terms of intra-firm low-wage mobility, low-wage
jobs might therefore be viewed as representing lower hierarchy jobs. Thus, the extent
of low-wage mobility should strongly depend on whether within-firm career paths
are also available for low-wage workers. However, even if such internal career paths
exit, only those workers who fulfill certain skill requirements may be expected to
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move-up the job ladder. This is captured by human capital theory which emphasises
the importance of on-the-job human capital accumulation for the extent of intra-
firm wage dynamics. The implications for earnings profiles have been extensively
analysed in the literature and generally predict wages to increase with experience
and tenure, but at decreasing rates (e.g. Topel 1991). According to these profiles,
the extent of mobility out of low-wage employment may therefore be expected to
decrease with tenure and age.
Finally, the concept of employer learning captures the notion that firms have
ex-ante incomplete information about a worker’s (unobserved) productivity. This
argument is particularly relevant in the context of low-wage employment relation-
ships, which are typically associated with low tenure.3 Employers only gradually
learn about a worker’s true ability with the accumulation of tenure, which may pos-
sibly translate into intra-firm wage mobility. In this context it is worth noting that
incomplete information about a worker’s true productivity should be particularly
relevant if low-wage employment is systematically associated with earlier career in-
terruptions, which makes it difficult to value a worker’s quality based upon previous
work performance.
3.2 Relevant Employer Characteristics
How can these considerations be operationalised in terms of measurable character-
istics at the employer level? Our empirical analysis will account for the following
observables: Firm size, the nature of industrial relations such as the existence of
a works council and a collective bargaining contract as well as information on the
firm’s skill composition. In what follows, we will spell out in more detail why we
consider these characteristics central to the study of wage dynamics:
Employer Size: In the literature on internal labour markets, firm size is typi-
cally viewed a good proxy for the presence of internal job ladders (e.g., Siebert and
Addison 1991). Thus, larger firms may provide low-wage workers with better career
opportunities and may positively affect the probability of escaping low pay provided
3For example, in our sample the fraction of low-wage earners with less than 60 months (5 years)
tenure is 61 (45) per cent among women in the service sector (manufacturing). For low-paid men
in the service sector (manufacturing) the corresponding fraction is 75 (61) per cent.
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such career paths do exist for the typical low-wage occupations. However, in terms
of the learning argument larger employers may also face a larger degree of informa-
tion asymmetries, which should render learning about a worker’s true productive
ability more difficult. While some authors have noted that greater difficulties in
determining the ability of workers may cause large employers to offer steeper wage
profiles (Lazear 1981), others have argued that larger employers have incentives to
adopt more extensive screening procedures prior to hiring. This, in turn, might lead
to significantly smaller wage growth at larger employers as, e.g., evidenced by Bar-
ron et al. (1987). As a result, firm size is likely to be associated with countervailing
effects on wage mobility so that the overall impact is ambiguous a-priori.
Industrial Relations: In Germany, employers may be subject to centralised
collective wage agreements, firm-specific collective agreements or, alternatively, to
no agreement at all. Centralised agreements are typically negotiated between an
industry-specific trade union and an employers’ association. Such contracts generally
stipulate wage increases based upon well-defined tenure profiles and may therefore
be envisaged as considerably facilitating intra-firm wage mobility.
A further reason for why industrial relations may be central to intra-firm wage
dynamics is that worker representations are often closely related to internal labour
markets. This is not only because worker representations may help establish ad-
ministered wage rules inherent to internal labour markets, but also because of their
potential role in monitoring promotions in internal labour markets (Siebert and
Addison 1991).
While there is a clear role for German trade unions in establishing administered
wage setting rules, they are unlikely to be involved in monitoring the wage setting
process and promotions at the firm level. The reason is that German trade unions
are generally organised along sectoral dimensions. In the German institutional en-
vironment, the monitoring role is rather taken by works councils, which provide
workers with the opportunity of employee representation at the establishment level.4
Their participation rights are laid down under the German Works Constitution Act
4While being legally mandatory in all establishments with at least 5 employees, a local worker
representation of this kind only takes institutional form if workers initiate a works council election.
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(”Betriebsverfassungsgesetz”) and include consultation, co-determination and infor-
mation rights, which generally increase with establishment size. These rights refer
to issues such as working hours regulations, health and safety matters and, most
importantly, the implementation of measures that aim at monitoring employee per-
formance (see e.g. Addison et al. 1997). Even though works councils are formally
prohibited from negotiating over wages which are typically stipulated by collective
bargaining agreements, they are widely recognised to have a substantial impact on
workers’ remunerations for several reasons. First, works councils are traditionally
involved in the implementation of collective bargaining agreements at the establish-
ment level and have a consent right with respect to the placement of workers in
certain wage groups. Second, works councils may also be expected to play a crucial
role in locally negotiating bonus rates and other forms of performance-related pay.
Consistent with these ideas, previous empirical studies have documented a signifi-
cant impact of works councils on wages (see e.g. Hu¨bler and Jirjahn 2003). Along
with their codetermination rights with respect to the monitoring process this leads
us to expect works councils being actively involved in monitoring promotions and
reducing information asymmetries concerning workers’ productivity levels.
Skill Composition: Finally, the employer-specific skill composition is meant
to capture different opportunities for on-the-job human capital acquisition. A larger
share of high-skilled workers is likely to impact positively upon wage mobility if, for
example, a larger fraction of skilled workers is associated with more intensive train-
ing measures as well as positive spillover effects on low-wage workers’ productivity
levels.5 To capture the employer-specific skill composition, we calculate the share
of high-skilled workers, the mean age of co-workers as well as the share of workers
who participate in on-the-job training measures.
5Another reason why co-worker characteristics may exert an impact on wages and wage growth
is the reduction of measurement error. To the extent that skills are measured with error and firms
tend to employ workers with similar levels of education, then an individual’s skill level might be
systematically related to its co-workers’ skills (see Card and de la Rica 2006).
8
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and Variable Description
The data used in this paper are taken from the IAB Linked Employer-Employee
Panel (LIAB) which combines data from the IAB-Establishment Panel and the Em-
ployment Statistics Register (see e.g. Alda et al. 2005). The IAB-Establishment
Panel is based on an annual survey of German establishments, whose sampling
frame encompasses all German establishments that employ at least one employee
paying social security contributions. The individual data stem from the Employ-
ment Statistics Register, which is an administrative data set based on reports from
employers in compliance with the notifying procedure for the German social security
system. This procedure obliges employers to provide a notification at the beginning
and the end of each employment relationship for all employees who are covered by
the German social security system. In addition, there is at least one annual com-
pulsory notification on the 31st December of each year. The notifications contain
information on individuals’ occupation, occupational status, qualification, sex, age,
nationality and, most importantly, on individual gross daily wages. Since there is an
upper contribution limit to the social security system, wages are top-coded. How-
ever, for our analysis top-coding is of minor relevance as the information on wages
is used only to classify individuals according to their low-pay status (see the next
section). In addition, the current available version of the LIAB data offer infor-
mation on daily wages rate and individuals’ employment status with a lead of five
years. Furthermore, the data provide information on individuals’ employment histo-
ries, such as the individuals’ employment status prior to their current employment
relationship.
Both data sets contain a unique establishment identifier which allows us to merge
the establishment data with information on all employees subject to social security
contributions. To construct the linked employer-employee data set, we first select
establishments from the IAB-Establishment Panel from the manufacturing and ser-
vice sector in western Germany for the year 1999. As the individual data contain
information on individuals’ employment status five years later, this enables us to
analyse low-pay transitions between 1999 and 2004. The establishment data give
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detailed information on a great deal of establishment characteristics, e.g. establish-
ment size, turnover, the nature of industrial relations, such as collective bargaining
coverage and the existence of a works council. As to collective bargaining coverage,
establishments are asked to report whether they are bound to an industry-wide col-
lective wage agreement or, alternatively, to a firm-specific wage agreement. Tables
A3 and A4 provide a more detailed description of the individual and establishment
covariates.
In a second step, we merge the establishment data with notifications for all em-
ployees who are employed by the selected establishments on June 30th. Because the
Employment Statistics Register lacks explicit information on hours worked, we drop
information for apprentices, part-time workers and home workers and confine our
attention to full-time workers. To avoid modeling human capital formation and re-
tirement decisions, we focus on individuals aged between 20 and 55 years. Moreover,
for those workers who have multiple employers we include only the employment rela-
tionship with the dominant employer, where the latter is inferred from the maximum
amount of daily earnings.
The final sample for male employees in the service sector (manufacturing sec-
tor) contains 71,037 (362,420) individuals in 684 (943) establishments. The sample
for female employees in the service sector (manufacturing sector) comprises 35,773
(77,726) individuals in 734 (878) establishments. The descriptive statistics are shown
in Table A1 and A2 in the appendix.
4.2 Definition of Low-Pay Status
Previous studies have used different definitions of the low-pay threshold, such as the
first quintile or third decile of the wage distribution (e.g. Cappellari 2002, 2007) or,
alternatively, some fixed proportions of the median wage (e.g. OECD 1998, Stewart
and Swaffield 1999 and European Commission 2004). Similar to Cappellari (2002,
2007), we define the low-pay threshold as the third decile of the wage distribution.6
In order to compute this threshold for the two years of interest (1999 and 2004),
6Robustness checks with respect to this definition are provided in Section 4.6.
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we need representative data at the individual level. Because our linked employer-
employee data are representative only at the establishment level, we complement
our analysis with information from the BA Employment Panel. This data set is
an 1.92% random sample drawn from the quarterly Employment Statistics of the
Federal Employment Agency and is representative for employees who are covered by
the German social security system. To compute the threshold, we keep individuals
whose employers are located in western Germany and exclude apprentices, part-time
and home workers as in our LIAB sample. To match the threshold definition with
the individual notifications from the LIAB data, we use gross monthly earnings for
the set date 30th June 1999 and 2004, respectively, and convert these values into
gross daily wages. The resulting low-pay thresholds are 67.66 e for 1999 and 71.88
e for 2004. According to this definition, the fraction of low paid workers in the
LIAB data was 28.21 per cent among females in the service sector in 1999 and 11.18
per cent among male service workers. In the manufacturing sector, the shares are
smaller and amount to 23.89 per cent among female and only 4.90 per cent among
male workers, respectively.
4.3 Pattern of Intra-Firm Low-Pay Transitions
Table 1 reports the conditional probabilities of being low paid in 2004 given a
worker’s low-pay status in 1999. The figures show that the probability of being
low paid in 2004 at the same employer is considerably higher for those who were
already low paid in 1999 than for those who were highly paid. Low-pay persistence
and inflow rates from high pay into low pay tend to be smaller among male workers
compared with their female counterparts (Rows (1) and (6)).
Table 1 further reports the probabilities of being low or highly paid after having
changed the employer. A comparison of the transition rates across formerly low
and highly paid workers shows that for the initially low paid an employer change
is much more frequently associated with low-pay persistence (Rows (3) and (8)).
Table 1 also reports the probabilities of falling out of the (full-time) earnings dis-
tribution. Individuals leaving full-time employment can be either unemployed and
receive transfers, non-employed, may enter occupational training or, alternatively,
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Table 1: Low-pay transition probabilities
Males Females
State in 1999 Low pay High pay Low pay High pay
State in 2004
Services
(1) Low pay in initial establishment 19.94 0.78 30.14 1.99
(2) High pay in initial establishment 14.81 60.67 11.58 46.63
(3) Low pay after employer change 16.94 1.14 10.72 1.66
(4) High pay after employer change 17.04 22.15 8.60 18.37
(5) Out of full-time employment 31.28 15.26 38.96 31.36
ASD 34.96 37.21
Manufacturing
(6) Low pay in initial establishment 17.01 0.37 27.39 1.74
(7) High pay in initial establishment 27.29 62.77 17.74 49.18
(8) Low pay after employer change 13.25 1.40 9.91 2.06
(9) High pay after employer change 16.26 21.81 7.17 18.26
(10) Out of full-time employment 26.20 13.65 37.79 28.76
ASD 28.48 33.5
Source: LIAB 1999.
may work part-time (either at the same or a different employer). The figures show
that the probabilities of leaving full-time employment are considerably larger for
those who were in the low-wage sector in 1999 as compared with higher paid em-
ployees. As expected, in both sectors the differences are much more pronounced
among male workers than among their female counterparts (Rows (5) and (10)).
Defining aggregate state dependence (ASD) as the difference between the prob-
abilities Pr (L2004 = 1|L1999 = 1) and Pr (L2004 = 1|L1999 = 0) , with Lt = 1 and
Lt = 0 denoting low and high pay in year t, Table 1 shows that ASD amounts to
34.96 percentage points for men and 37.21 percentage points for women in the ser-
vice sector. In manufacturing, ASD turns out to be somewhat smaller and amounts
to 28.48 percentage points for male and 33.5 percentage points for female employees.
Conditional on staying with the same employer, the figures become larger. The cor-
responding values are 57.37 percentage points for males and 72.2 percentage points
for females in the service sector, as well as 37.8 percentage points for males and 57.7
percentage points for females in manufacturing.
To assess the importance of some selected employer characteristics for low-pay
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transitions, Table 2 displays transitions rates into low pay cross-tabulated by size
classes, the existence of a works council and collective bargaining (industry-wide
contract, firm-specific contract and no coverage). Due to the focus on the employer
attributes, we restrict the sample to those individuals who stay (full-time) employed
with their current employer. The first noteworthy fact that emerges from Table 2 is
that persistence rates nearly monotonically decline with employer size (an exception
are the rates for females in the service sector, see Column (3) in Panel A). A similar
pattern of results holds for entry rates even though in some groups individuals in the
largest size class (establishments with at least 5,000 employees) exhibit somewhat
higher transition rates than those in the adjacent class (1,000 < Size < 5,000). As
to collective bargaining coverage, workers employed by non-covered establishments
generally have higher persistence and entry probabilities as compared with those
working at covered employers. The only exception that stands out here are women
in manufacturing, who exhibit larger persistence probabilities when their employer
is covered by a firm–specific contract (Panel B, Column (3)).
Finally, the figures displayed in the last two rows in each panel show that persis-
tence as well as entry probabilities are consistently smaller when the employer has
a works council. Even though these figures reveal some striking patterns of low-pay
transitions, it needs to be emphasised that on the one hand, the employer attributes
displayed in Table 2 are strongly positively correlated, and, on the other hand, there
may be a large amount of selection upon unobservables into establishments. This
raises the question as to how the established relationships between low-pay tran-
sitions and employer characteristics hold if one accounts for these correlations and
unobserved individual heterogeneity. We will address these questions in turn in our
multivariate econometric framework.
4.4 Econometric Analysis of Low-Pay Transitions
As noted at the outset, the high degree of aggregate state dependence observed in
the data does not control for heterogeneity - either observed or unobserved. The
aim of the multivariate analysis is to characterise the determinants of low-pay per-
sistence and exit rates by explicitly distinguishing between observed and unobserved
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Table 2: Low-pay transition probabilities across different employers
Males Females
State in 1999 Low pay High pay Low pay High pay
Low pay in 2004 (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Services
Size < 100 68.33 4.41 81.11 9.19
100 ≤ Size < 500 65.55 2.76 81.81 5.76
500 ≤ Size < 1,000 54.92 1.73 62.77 5.46
1,000 ≤ Size < 5,000 41.80 0.53 65.32 2.70
Size ≥ 5,000 9.09 0.66 64.13 3.30
Industry-wide contract 56.44 1.37 72.10 3.88
Firm-specific contract 50.15 0.84 55.16 3.47
No contract 67.53 1.16 80.23 6.53
Works council 53.83 1.09 70.15 3.90
No works council 69.10 4.54 82.95 8.19
B. Manufacturing
Size < 100 60.72 4.60 87.59 6.75
100 ≤ Size < 500 46.67 1.50 72.74 4.69
500 ≤ Size < 1,000 36.60 0.57 64.89 4.57
1,000 ≤ Size < 5,000 25.31 0.49 45.14 3.31
Size ≥ 5,000 9.84 0.17 22.73 1.31
Industry-wide contract 33.44 0.45 57.12 3.02
Firm-specific contract 49.41 1.20 73.05 4.16
No contract 56.31 2.30 70.32 9.23
Works council 35.25 0.55 57.91 3.35
No works council 60.70 3.14 83.41 6.83
Source: LIAB 1999. The sample is restricted to employees who
stay with their employer in 2004.
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heterogeneity and true state dependence.
4.4.1 Model Specification
To analyse low-pay transitions, we estimate the probability of being low paid in
period t, conditional on the lagged pay status in t− 5. An endogeneity issue which
is commonly referred to as the ’initial conditions problem’ (Heckman 1981) arises
if the starting point of the earnings process cannot be observed in the data and
the unobservables affecting these processes are correlated. A solution is to augment
the model of interest with an equation for the initial condition and to allow for a
correlation between the error terms of both equations. To provide our employer
attributes of interest with a meaningful interpretation, we model the transition pro-
cess for those who stay with their employer. This gives rise to a second endogeneity
issue since intra-firm pay transitions are only observable for employees who stay
full-time employed with their employer. If unobservables affecting the probability
of drop out and the initial low-pay status are correlated, the resulting attrition will
be endogenous to the pay transition process.7
In order to account for these selections mechanisms, we estimate a trivariate
probit model. Multivariate probit models have been adopted in a number of recent
studies analysing labour market dynamics (e.g. Cappellari 2007, Cappellari and
Jenkins 2008). Our model includes the determination of low-pay status in period
t − 5 (to account for the initial conditions problem), the determination of whether
full-time earnings at the same employer are observed at both points in time, t − 5
and t (employer retention), the determination of pay status in period t, and finally
the correlation of unobservables affecting theses processes.
We start by specifying the initial low-pay status. Let l∗it−5 denote a latent low-pay
propensity for individual i at the start of the observation period and xit−5 represents
a set of individual and employer-specific characteristics. xit−5 includes age, age
7Non-retention therefore comprises either a (full-time) employer change, becoming part-time
employed at the same or a different employer or becoming unemployed or non-employed. Strictly
speaking, as we do have information on these different employment states, we could model these
processes by estimating a four-variate or even higher dimensional Probit model. However, due to
our large sample size we refrain from estimating such models due to the computational burden
involved by higher-dimension Probit models.
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squared, tenure, tenure squared as well as dummies on educational attainment (five
categories) and occupational status to capture labour market experience and human
capital endowment. We also include information on the employment history, such
as the employment status prior to entry into the current establishment as well as the
number of previous unemployment spells with transfer receipt. We further include
employer characteristics such as establishment size, the nature of industrial relations,
two-digit sectoral affiliation, the share of fixed-term contracts as well as information
on the employer-specific skill composition (the share of high-skilled workers, the
share of workers who participated in training measures and the mean age). uit−5
is the sum of an individual-specific effect, µi, and an orthogonal white-noise error,
λit−5, and is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution.
l∗it−5 = β
′xit−5 + uit−5, uit−5 = µi + λit−5 ∼ N (0, 1) (1)
If l∗it−5 exceeds some unobservable value (normalised to zero), individual i is observed
to be low paid. We define a binary indicator Lit−5 = 1 if l∗it−5 > 0 and zero
otherwise.
The next process to be specified is the employer retention. We assume that the
propensity to observe full-time earnings of individual i in period t− 5 and t at the
same employer can be described by a latent retention index r∗it,
r∗it = δ
′yit−5 + εit, εit = ηi + ξit ∼ N (0, 1) , (2)
where the error term εit is standard normally distributed and specified as the sum
of an individual-specific effect, ηi, and an orthogonal white-noise error, ξit. yit−5
includes factors affecting both earnings and the attachment to paid employment.
yit−5 contains xit−5, i.e. we assume that all factors affecting earnings levels are also
relevant in determining employer retention. yit−5 additionally includes expected
employer-specific employment growth as an explanatory factor for employer reten-
tion. If the latent retention propensity of individual i is lower than some critical
unobserved value (again normalised to zero), earnings and low-pay status cannot be
observed in period t. Let Rit be a binary variable of the employer retention outcome
of each individual, whereas Rit = 1 if r
∗
it > 0 and zero otherwise.
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The third component of the model is the specification of the low-pay status in
period t. We assume that the latent propensity of low pay can be characterised by
l∗it = [(Lit−5) γ
′
1 + (1− Lit−5) γ′2] zit−5 + υit, υit = τi + ζit ∼ N (0, 1) , (3)
with υit denoting the sum of an individual-specific effect, τi, and an orthogonal
white-noise error, ζit.The column vector zit−5 comprises individual and employer-
specific attributes affecting the pay status in t. In order to deal with simultaneous
changes in covariates and pay status, the employer and individual characteristics
pertain to period t− 5. The switching specification in (3) allows the impact of the
explanatory variables to differ according to the low-pay status in the initial period.
Again, Lit denotes a binary variable Lit = 1 if l
∗
it > 0 and zero otherwise, where
Lit is only observable if Rit = 1. As a consequence, the sample likelihood will be
endogenously truncated.
We assume that the error terms in each of the three equations are jointly dis-
tributed as trivariate normal with unrestricted correlations, which can be written
as
ρ1 ≡ corr (uit−5, εit) (4)
ρ2 ≡ corr (uit−5, υit) (5)
ρ3 ≡ corr (vit, εit) . (6)
The cross-equation correlations provide a parameterisation of unobserved hetero-
geneity. The correlation ρ1 describes the relationship between unobservable factors
affecting the initial low-pay status and employer retention. A negative sign suggests
that individuals who were more likely to be low paid in the initial period are more
likely to drop out of full-time employment at the same employer compared with
highly paid individuals. The correlation ρ2 summarises the association between un-
observable factors determining the initial and the current low-pay status. Here a
positive sign would imply that individuals earning low pay in t are more likely to re-
main in the low-pay status. Finally, the correlation ρ3 characterises the relationship
between unobservables affecting the retention propensity and the current low-pay
status. A negative sign would indicate that individuals employed at both points in
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time are more likely to escape low pay in t as compared to individuals dropping out
of full-time employment at the same employer. Estimation of unconstrained cross-
correlation coefficients provides a test of whether initial conditions and the employer
retention process may be treated as exogenous. In particular, ρ1 = ρ3 = 0 would
imply that the employer retention process is exogenous and would give rise to a bi-
variate probit model. Similarly, testing the exogeneity of initial conditions amounts
to testing ρ1 = ρ2 = 0. Finally, if all cross-equation correlations are zero, then γ1
and γ2 can be consistently estimated using univariate probit models on sub-samples
depending on individuals’ initial pay status (Lit−5 = 0 or Lit−5 = 1).
Estimating the model with unrestricted cross-equation correlations requires iden-
tifying restrictions, i.e. variables entering xit−5 or yit−5 but not zit−5 in the transi-
tion equation. We exclude expected employment growth and the share of fixed-term
contracts from the equation for low-pay transitions and test the validity of these
restrictions using functional form as the identifying restriction.
4.4.2 Measures of State Dependence
One important issue in the dynamic analysis of low pay is the investigation of state
dependence. Following Cappellari (2007), we distinguish between aggregate state
dependence (ASD) and genuine state dependence (GSD). ASD is obtained by com-
puting the difference in average predicted transition probabilities for those who were
low paid in t− 5 and for those who were initially highly paid:
ASD =
∑
i∈(Lit−5=1,Rit=1) Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 1)∑
i Lit−5 ·Rit
−
∑
i∈(Lit−5=0,Rit=1) Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 0)∑
i (1− Lit−5) ·Rit
=
∑
i∈(Lit−5=1,Rit=1)
Φ2(zit−5γ̂1,xit−5β̂;ρ2)
Φ(xit−5β̂)∑
i Lit−5 ·Rit
−
∑
i∈(Lit−5=0,Rit=1)
Φ2(zit−5γ̂2,−xit−5β̂;−ρ2)
Φ(−xit−5β̂)∑
i (1− Lit−5) ·Rit
,
(7)
where Φ (·) and Φ2 (·) are cumulative density functions of the univariate and
bivariate standard normal distributions. This measure does not take into account
individual observed or unobserved heterogeneity.
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Genuine state dependence arises if initial low pay causes low-pay employment in
the future for reasons of stigmatization or human capital depreciation. The absence
of GSD can be directly tested by using the endogenous switching structure in (3)
and amounts to testing the null hypothesis H0 : γ1 = γ2. To account for individual-
specific heterogeneity the GSD measure is based upon individual-specific probability
differences. In particular, GSD is derived by computing for each individual the
difference between the predicted transition probability conditional on being initially
low paid and the predicted transition probability conditional on being initially highly
paid, and then averaging the difference over the sample of those with observed
earnings in t and t− 5:
GSD =
1∑
i
Rit
∑
i∈Rit=1
[Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 1)− Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 0)] =
1∑
i
Rit
∑
i∈Rit=1
Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂1, xit−5β̂; ρ2
)
Φ
(
xit−5β̂
) − Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂2,−xit−5β̂;−ρ2
)
Φ
(
−xit−5β̂
)
(8)
4.4.3 Log-Likelihood Function and Marginal Effects
The log-likelihood contribution for each individual i with earnings information ob-
served in period t− 5 is:
log£i = Lit−5Rit log [Φ3 (giγ′1zit−5, hiδ
′yit−5, diβ′xit−5; gihiρ3, gidiρ2, hidiρ1)]
+ (1− Lit−5)Rit log [Φ3 (giγ′2zit−5, hiδ′yit−5, diβ′xit−5; gihiρ3, gidiρ2, hidiρ1)]
+ (1−Rit) log [Φ2 (hiδ′yit−5, diβ′xit−5;hidiρ1)] (9)
where Φ3 is the cumulative density function of the trivariate standard normal
distribution and gi ≡ 2Lit − 1, hi ≡ 2Rit − 1, di ≡ 2Lit−5 − 1. We compute the
trivariate standard normal distribution by applying the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane
(GHK) simulator, yielding a maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimator (see
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Cappellari and Jenkins 2006).8
Our estimation sample is based on those individuals for whom we observe full-
time earnings in our matched employer-employee data set. In this data set, we
observe for each establishment the initial pay status for all employees.9 As the re-
peated observation of employer-specific characteristics violates the i.i.d. assumption
of the maximum likelihood estimation approach, we adjust the standard errors using
a robust variance estimator based on clusters at the establishment level.10
In order to simplify the interpretation of the estimation results, we report the
marginal effects (ME) showing the impact on the relevant probabilities of a change
in the chosen covariate. For a dummy variable, the ME is calculated as a change
in the probability resulting from a change in the indicator’s value from zero to one,
holding all other covariates fixed at their sample median values. ME for contin-
uous variables are usually estimated by evaluating the partial derivative, which is
equal to the corresponding coefficient multiplied by an evaluation of the normal
density function. However, here the computation is not straightforward because the
transition probabilities are conditional in nature (e.g. the probability of low pay
in t conditional of being low paid in t − 5). To clarify this point, the conditional
probabilities are given by:
eit ≡ Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 1) =
Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂1, xit−5β̂; ρ2
)
Φ
(
xit−5β̂
) (10)
and
fit ≡ Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 0) =
Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂2,−xit−5β̂;−ρ2
)
Φ
(
−xit−5β̂
) (11)
As is evident from eqs. (10) and (11), a change in the value of a covariate may
affect both the numerator and denominator of the conditional probabilities. In order
8More precisely, we use the GHK simulator with 100 Halton draws and antithetic draws for
three dimensions.
9More specifically, we observe all employees who are covered by the social security system.
10See for further explanations Wooldrige (2002, Chapter 13, p. 404).
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to deal with this issue, we adopt the procedure suggested by Stewart and Swaffield
(1999) (see also Cappellari (2007) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2008)) by keeping
the elements of xit−5 fixed. To do so, we first predict the low-pay probability in t−5
for all low paid individuals and take the average over these values - denoted as q. By
inserting w = Φ−1 (q) into eq. (10) we obtain Φ2 (zit−5γ̂1, w; ρ2) /w. This expression
is used to calculate ME as deviations between the conditional probabilities for a
reference person and hypothetical probabilities induced by changing each covariate
by an unit. For the reference person, we set continuous covariates to the sample
median values and dummy variables to zero. The same procedure is applied to fit.
4.5 Results
In this section, we report the results from estimating our specified model separately
by gender. For females, we provide separate estimates for the manufacturing and
service sector, whereas for male workers our estimates are confined to the service
sector. The underlying reason for this restriction is the very low proportion of male
low-wage workers in manufacturing (below 5 per cent), which makes it difficult to
obtain a well-behaved specification for this group of workers.11
Table 3: Diagnostic tests
Females Males
Services Manufacturing Services
χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
A. Exclusion of Instruments
Instrument I from transition eq. 0.98 0.614 0.02 0.990 0.41 0.816
Instrument II from transition eq. 3.82 0.148 3.79 0.150 3.40 0.182
Instruments I and II from transition eq. 5.44 0.245 6.31 0.177 3.52 0.474
B. Inclusion of Instruments
Instrument I in retention eq. 8.77 0.003 10.14 0.002 11.12 0.001
Instrument II in initial condition eq. 5.21 0.023 6.57 0.010 12.10 0.001
Note: Instrument I denotes expected positive employment growth and instrument II refers to the
share of fixed-term contracts in all subsamples.
11In the appendix, we also present the results from estimating the model for male workers
in manufacturing for the sake of completeness. However, as can be seen from Table A6 in the
appendix, our instruments fail to provide valid exclusion restrictions for this subgroup of workers.
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Table 3 reports the tests for the validity of the exclusion restrictions for our
four estimation samples. Referring to Panel A of Table 3, the figures show that the
specifications pass the exclusion tests for our imposed restrictions (with sufficiently
large p−values). In Panel B, the test statistics also reveal that the exclusion of
the imposed restrictions from the initial conditions and retention equation can be
rejected at conventional significance levels.
Table 4 reports the estimates of the correlation coefficients across the three equa-
tions. For males in the service sector, the figures provide evidence of the endogeneity
of the initial conditions equation. This contrasts with females, for whom the hy-
pothesis of exogeneity and no unobserved heterogeneity cannot be rejected (with a
p−value of 0.193). This finding suggests that much of the heterogeneity governing
the selection and transition processes of females is already accounted for by our
observed individual and employer-specific attributes. In manufacturing, in contrast,
endogeneity of the retention and initial condition process is of much larger concern
for females, as the null of the exogeneity of the underlying process has to be rejected
for both equations. As expected, the correlation between unobservables affecting
retention and initial conditions is estimated to be negative, which suggests that in-
dividuals with unobserved factors fostering low-wage employment are less likely to
stay full-time employed with their employer. The negative correlation between the
retention and initial condition indicates that those who were initially low paid are
less likely to be employed at both points in time. Note that there is no significant
correlation between the initial condition and the transition equation for males and
females in the service sector, suggesting that any bias due to the selection into low-
wage employment influences the transition process through its impact on employer
retention.
Tables 5 and 6 report the results from estimating the transition equation (3) sep-
arately by gender (for females both for the service and manufacturing sector). The
tables display the marginal effects of our individual and employer-specific explana-
tory variables on the low-pay transition probabilities. In line with the switching
regression specification, the marginal effects are reported for those who where ini-
tially low paid and for those initially highly paid. For the former group the effects
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Table 4: Cross equation correlation structure
Females Males
Services Manufacturing Services
Correlation Structure Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
ρ1 (Initial conditions - retention) -.043 0.060 -.170 0.000 -.111 0.000
ρ2 (Initial conditions - transition) -.415 0.186 -.500 0.040 -.012 0.975
ρ3 (Retention - transition) 0.092 0.502 -.006 0.978 -.190 0.368
Hypothesis Tests χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Exogeneity of initial conditions
H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 4.09 0.130 36.05 0.000 13.61 0.001
Exogeneity of retention
H0 : ρ1 = ρ3 = 0 4.29 0.117 38.24 0.000 13.48 0.001
Unobserved heterogeneity
H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 = 0 4.73 0.193 38.71 0.000 13.61 0.004
are to be interpreted in terms of persistence effects, whereas for the latter group
the marginal effects refer to the probability of entering low pay. Marginal effects
are calculated as described in Section 4.4.3 and are to be interpreted as deviations
from a reference person. The reference individual has all dummies set to zero12and
is defined by setting the continuous covariates equal to their sample median values.
In Table 5, the first two rows report the average transition probabilities and those
for the reference individual - which is referred to as the baseline probability. For
females in the service sector, the baseline persistence probability of 0.90 is consid-
erably larger than the average transition probability, whereas the opposite is true
for entry probabilities. In manufacturing, transition probabilities of the reference
individual both for the initially low and highly paid tend to be larger as compared
with the average. The bottom row of Table 5 shows both the ASD and GSD mea-
sure as described in Section 4.4.2. The figures show that there is still considerable
state dependence even after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
In the service sector, GSD amounts to 0.583, which is still about 82 per cent of
ASD. In manufacturing, accounting for heterogeneity leads to a larger reduction in
12I.e., the reference individual has a vocational degree, a simple blue-collar occupation and had no
regular employment-relationship prior to entry into the current establishment. As to the employer
characteristics, the reference worker is employed by an establishment that belongs to the financial
intermediation sector (in manufacturing: to the raw materials sector), has no works council and
no collective agreement and employs at least 5,000 workers.
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state dependence, as ASD is reduced by about 40 per cent.
Referring to the upper part of Table 5, our estimates for females in the service
sector indicate that observable individual attributes significantly affect the proba-
bility of both staying and becoming low paid. As to the persistence effects (see
Columns (1) and (2)), older women and those without any educational degree ex-
hibit significant higher persistence probabilities as compared to the reference woman
in the service sector. Also, working in a service or qualified blue-collar occupation
appears to significantly worsen the probability of escaping low pay. The result for
qualified blue-collars is somewhat surprising and may hint to the fact that low paid
women with a qualified blue-collar occupation are particularly negatively selected
and have already reached the top of the job ladder. This may give rise to less pro-
motion and therefore transition possibilities as compared with those with a unqual-
ified occupation. On the contrary, there are less observed individual characteristics
that serve to keep initially highly paid women out of low pay: for this group only
the lower education and technical-college dummies turn out to be significant (see
Columns (3) and (4)). The corresponding results for female manufacturing workers
are shown in Columns (5) to (8). Compared with the estimates for the service sec-
tor, the pattern of results is reversed as observables appear to be more relevant for
entry probabilities. Moreover, the results from Columns (5) and (7) indicate that
some occupational categories, such as technicians, clerical workers and the category
”professional, managers and others” significantly reduce persistence as well as entry
probabilities. Particularly for persistence probabilities, these effects are not only
significant but also economically sizeable, as belonging to these occupational groups
reduces persistence probabilities between 12.7 and 27.7 percentage points.
We next turn to the employer characteristics, which are reported in the lower
part of Table 5. Our considerations from Section 3 suggested that if internal labour
markets were an important ingredient of within-firm wage growth, the marginal ef-
fects on persistence of the employer size dummies should be positive (relative to the
reference individual working in an establishment with at least 5,000 employees). For
females in the service sector, the estimates reported in column (1) provide no evi-
dence of this effect, as the marginal effects are consistently estimated to be negative
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and are statistically insignificant. As to the entry effects, only in small establish-
ments the probability of entering low pay is significantly larger as compared with the
reference group of establishments with at least 5,000 employees. In manufacturing,
persistence probabilities are significantly larger only in small plants, the same is true
for entry probabilities. For the remaining size classes, however, the marginal effects
on persistence are estimated to be negative and are not statistically significant at
conventional levels.
Turning next to the industrial relations effects (comprising the effects of works
councils as well as firm and industry-level contracts), the estimates indicate that
industrial relations are important both for persistence as well as entry probabili-
ties. In the service sector, industrial relations appear to be an effective means in
helping women either to escape or to keep them out of low pay. The estimates
reported in column (1) indicate that initially low paid women significantly benefit
from firm-specific contracts and works councils, even though the estimate for firm-
specific contracts is significant only at the 10 per cent level. However, the marginal
effect from this institution is economically non-negligible: Initially low paid females
subject to a firm-level contract experience a probability of remaining low paid that
is 8.4 percentage points lower as compared with the reference worker. This amounts
to a reduction of the baseline probability by about 10 per cent. In contrast, the
effect of works councils is estimated with more precision, leading to a reduction of
the persistence probability by about 6.6 percentage points. Moreover, the marginal
effects displayed in column (3) show that industry as well as firm-specific contracts
also have a significant impact on the probability of entering low pay, by almost
halving the baseline probability of 0.061.
For manufacturing, the results are somewhat less pronounced. While collective
contracts significantly reduce entry probabilities, there are no significant marginal
effects on persistence probabilities. The marginal effect for works councils on low-pay
persistence is also negative and large (-10 percentage points), but is very imprecisely
estimated, only bordering significance with a p−value of 0.13.
From the skill composition covariates, a larger share of high-skilled workers helps
female workers to escape low pay in the manufacturing sector. The marginal effect
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Table 5: Estimation results for low-pay transitions of female workers
Females Services Manufacturing
Wage in t-5 Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average prediction 0.681 0.131 0.554 0.112
Baseline 0.903 0.061 0.736 0.161
Explanatory variable in t-5 ME z - ME z - ME z - ME z -
ratio ratio ratio ratio
Individual Characteristics
Age 0.018
∗∗
2.52 -.009 -.75 0.000 0.01 -.027 -1.11
Age squared -.000
∗∗∗
-2.72 0.000 0.78 0.000 0.37 0.000 1.12
Lower education 0.049
∗∗∗
4.41 0.067
∗∗∗
3.21 0.022 0.97 0.032
∗∗
2.22
Higher sec. education -.057 -.99 0.031 1.53 -.036 -.39 0.042 1.12
Voc. training + high -.133
∗∗∗
-2.68 -.014 -1.46 -.093 -1.32 0.070
∗∗
2.22
Technical college -.084 -1.26 -.046
∗∗∗
-4.42 -.027 -.22 -.029 -1.01
University -.030 -.44 -.019 -1.36 -.095 -.39 0.006 0.17
Job tenure -.001 -.64 -.000 -.69 0.000 0.84 -.000 -.90
Job tenure squared 0.000 0.64 0.000 0.74 -.000 -.93 0.000 0.77
Qualified blue-collar 0.060
∗∗∗
4.13 0.057 1.13 0.067 1.59 -.005 -.13
Technician and engineer 0.020 0.49 0.050 1.06 -.218
∗∗
-2.56 -.059
∗∗∗
-3.17
Service occupation 0.042
∗∗
2.52 0.072 1.58 -.005 -.11 0.026 0.45
Clerical, administrative -.021 -.65 0.012 0.44 -.127
∗∗
-2.05 -.067
∗∗∗
-4.46
Professional, managers 0.004 0.10 0.025 0.73 -.277
∗
-1.70 -.060
∗∗
-2.08
# Previous benefit spells 0.006 0.83 0.005 0.60 -.001 -.19 0.004 1.04
Regular employment history -.007 -.47 -.009 -1.44 -.020 -.92 -.016 -1.48
Employer Characteristics
Size < 100 -.021 -.24 0.155
∗∗∗
2.59 0.160
∗∗
2.00 0.129
∗
1.70
100 ≤ Size < 500 -.049 -.51 0.048 1.37 -.036 -.25 0.068 1.29
500 ≤ Size < 1000 -.157 -1.10 0.042 1.36 -.087 -.61 0.063 1.35
1000 ≤ Size < 5000 -.142 -1.04 0.012 0.46 -.208 -1.56 0.043 1.01
Industry-wide contract -.029 -1.14 -.027
∗∗∗
-3.04 -.033 -.67 -.090
∗∗∗
-3.35
Firm-specific contract -.084
∗
-1.74 -.033
∗∗∗
-2.82 -.058 -.64 -.111
∗∗∗
-4.32
Works council -.066
∗∗
-2.00 0.020 0.89 -.102 -1.50 0.025 0.61
Mean Age 0.002 0.71 0.001 0.38 0.004 0.56 -.005 -1.34
Share of high-skilled -.010 -1.09 -.002 -.58 -.012
∗∗∗
-2.89 -.001 -.57
Training share -.000 -.43 0.000 0.43 -.002
∗∗
-2.27 -.000 -.62
ASD (GSD) 0.713 (0.583) 0.584 (0.336)
Number of observations 35,773 77,726
Note: See main text for description of the estimation method and the definition of marginal effects.
All specifications additionally include regional dummies and further sectoral dummies according to the
classification shown in Tables A2 and A4 in the appendix. ∗∗∗;∗∗ ;∗ significant at 1, 5, 10 per cent level.
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has an equal magnitude in the service sector, but is not significant. The share of
workers experiencing training measures significantly decreases persistence probabili-
ties in manufacturing. In contrast, entry probabilities of initially highly paid females
are not greatly affected by these co-worker characteristics.
Table 6 reports the results from estimating our model for male workers in the
service sector. The results for the individual covariates are again shown in the upper
panel of Table 6. Similar to female workers, older employees experience significantly
larger persistence probabilities. For male workers, having a university degree sig-
nificantly lowers the probability of remaining in the low-wage sector (Columns (1)
and (2)). While a university degree is also relevant in sheltering initially highly paid
men from entering low pay (see Columns (3) and (4)), the marginal effect is lower as
compared with its effect on the persistence probability. A university degree reduces
the probability of staying low paid by about 19 percentage points, whereas it reduces
the entry probability by 0.9 percentage points. Note, however, that given the small
baseline probability of 1 per cent this is a sizeable effect. Marginal effects of similar
magnitude can be found for some professional groups, such as technicians and engi-
neers as well as clerical and administrative employees and professionals/managers.
We next turn to the employer attributes for which the marginal effects are shown
in the lower panel of Table 6. While there appears to be no role of employer size
in helping women to escape low pay, the opposite is true for male employees. The
marginal effects of the employer size dummies are all estimated to be positive and -
with the exception of establishments between 1,000 and 5,000 employees - statisti-
cally significant at conventional levels (Column (1)).
Further, the effects are not only significant, but also economically sizeable and
much larger in magnitude than the marginal effects of the individual characteristics.
For instance, working in a small establishment with less than 100 employees increases
the probability of staying low paid by almost 27 percentage point, which amounts
to almost half of the baseline probability. Comparing employer size effects across
gender in the service sector, it is worth noting that - except for the largest size class
- the differences in the marginal effects are statistically significant at conventional
levels.
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Table 6: Estimation results for low-pay transitions of male workers
Males Services
Wage in t-5 Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average prediction 0.645 0.011
Baseline 0.594 0.011
Explanatory variable in t-5 ME z -ratio ME z -ratio
Individual Characteristics
Age 0.047
∗∗
2.00 0.001 0.24
Age squared -.001 -1.61 -.000 -.20
Lower education 0.054 1.37 -.001 -.30
Higher sec. education -.097 -1.11 -.004 -.87
Voc. training + high -.060 -.91 -.004 -1.54
Technical college 0.148 1.07 -.002 -.56
University -.193
∗
-1.94 -.009
∗∗∗
-5.30
Job tenure 0.002 1.30 -.000 -.39
Job tenure squared -.000 -.96 0.000 0.40
Qualified blue-collar 0.043 0.59 -.005 -1.62
Technician and engineer 0.027 0.24 -.007
∗∗∗
-2.81
Service occupation 0.043 0.62 -.001 -.41
Clerical, administrative 0.003 0.04 -.007
∗∗∗
-4.58
Professional, managers 0.028 0.25 -.008
∗∗∗
-4.04
# Previous benefit spells 0.004 0.53 0.000 0.39
Regular employment history -.018 -.43 -.004
∗∗∗
-3.36
Employer Characteristics
Size < 100 0.268
∗∗∗
2.61 0.022 1.02
100 ≤ Size < 500 0.276∗∗∗ 3.26 0.005 0.50
500 ≤ Size < 1000 0.211∗ 1.75 0.001 0.10
1000 ≤ Size < 5000 0.154 1.29 -.008∗∗∗ -2.59
Industry-wide contract -.061 -1.00 0.004 0.66
Firm-specific contract -.075 -.64 -.004 -.88
Works council -.033 -.56 0.000 0.00
Mean Age 0.005 0.75 0.001 0.24
Share of high-skilled -.016
∗∗∗
-3.03 -.001 -.33
Training share 0.002
∗∗∗
3.09 0.000 0.32
ASD (GSD) 0.567 (0.389)
Number of observations 71,037
Note: See main text for description of the estimation method and
the definition of marginal effects. All specifications additionally
include regional dummies and sectoral dummies according to the
classification shown in Tables A2 and A4 in the appendix.
∗∗∗;∗∗ ;∗ significant at 1, 5, 10 per cent level.
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From Section 3, recall that our established finding that employer size does not
matter for women may be explained by countervailing effects that result from less
employer learning about workers’ true productivity levels, or alternatively, from
more extensive screening procedures prior to hiring. While we are not able to distin-
guish these approaches, either explanation is related to a larger degree of information
asymmetries about female workers’ true productivity as compared with their male
counterparts. This is consistent with the notion that incomplete information should
be particularly relevant for those having more career interruptions, which makes it
difficult to value a worker’s quality based upon previous work performance.
Turning next to the industrial relations effects, the pattern of results is reversed
as compared with our findings for females. While for female workers industrial re-
lations appear to be an effective means in helping them either to escape or enter
low pay, our findings provide no evidence of such a significant effect for male work-
ers. In particular, the marginal effect of works councils on low-pay persistence is
much smaller in magnitude (-0.033) than that for women. Even though the dif-
ferences in the marginal effects of works councils on the persistence probabilities
across male and female workers are not statistically significant, the results provide
some weak evidence for works councils having a more pronounced effect for female
low paid workers. In line with our reasoning for employer size effects, this result
is consistent with the asymmetric information story as works councils may help to
reduce information asymmetries about workers’ productivity, which - as we argued
above - is likely to be considerably larger for females as compared with their male
counterparts.
For males, the share of high-skilled workers is also found to significantly reduce
persistence probabilities. Further, the size of the marginal effect is very similar to
that obtained for females: a one percentage point increase in the share of high-skilled
workers (relative to the reference worker) reduces the probability of staying low paid
by roughly one percentage point. Interestingly, the share of workers experiencing
training measures significantly increases the probability of initially low paid men of
staying in the low-sector. While this finding is clearly at variance with what one
might expect, it may reflect that training measures in the service sector are not
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targeted towards those who are initially low paid and may point to a particular
negative selection of low-wage workers into establishments with a large fraction of
workers participating in training. Overall, our estimates indicate, that for males in
the service sector employer attributes appear to be more important for persistence
rather than for entry probabilities.
4.6 Robustness Checks
To assess the sensitivity of our findings with respect to the low-wage threshold,
we re-ran all specifications using the first quintile as the low-pay threshold.13 For
females, the overall pattern of results with respect to the importance of plant size
and industrial relations remains unchanged, with employer size (again except for
the smallest size class in manufacturing) playing no significant role for low-pay
persistence and works councils significantly reducing the probability of staying low-
paid. Compared with the results reported in Table 5, the marginal effect of works
councils on low-pay persistence in manufacturing becomes even more pronounced,
with a point estimate of -0.27 which is now statistically significant at the 1 per cent
level. While the estimates for males in the service sector again point to insignificant
marginal effects of the industrial relations covariates, the estimates of the employer
size marginal effects on low-pay persistence are positive only for the two smallest
size classes and are very imprecisely estimated. A possible explanation for the
insignificant estimates might relate to the fact that using a lower quantile as the
low-pay threshold considerably reduces the incidence of low-pay among males and
therefore gives rise to much more imprecise estimates for this group.
5 Conclusions
The purpose of the present paper was to study the importance of employer-specific
determinants in escaping low earnings in Germany. In order to address the initial
conditions problem and the endogeneity of employer retention, we have modelled
low pay transitions using a trivariate Probit model that accounts for selection into
13For the sake of expositional brevity, the results are not reported here, but are available on
request.
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low-wage employment and non-random employer drop out. Using data from a large-
scale Linked Employer–Employee panel data set, our findings indicate that while
aggregate state dependence is considerably reduced once observed and unobserved
characteristics are accounted for, the magnitude of genuine state dependence still
remains substantial. For females in services and manufacturing, GSD still accounts
for 82 and 58 per cent of ASD and amounts to 0.583 and 0.336, respectively. For
males in the service sector, we obtain a GSD measure of 0.389, accounting for 69
per cent of ASD. Overall, our findings indicate that employer characteristics play
an important role in helping workers to escape their low pay status. At least for the
service sector, our findings allow us to draw some conclusions about gender-specific
patterns of the importance of employer covariates. While for male workers from the
service sector the probability of escaping low pay tends to increase with employer
size, female workers rather benefit from collective bargaining coverage contracts
and the presence of local works councils. While these findings support the notion
that internal labour markets are an important ingredient of male within-firm wage
growth, they do not necessarily contradict the view that internal labour markets
also exist for female low-wage workers. The only conclusion that can be inferred
from our findings is that for females there are potential countervailing effects of
plant size which might arise from a larger degree fo asymmetric information at
larger employers. Along with the differences in the industrial relations effects this
leads us to conclude that the removal of asymmetric information appears to be more
relevant in explaining female workers’ wage transitions as compared with their male
counterparts.
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6 Appendix
Services Manufacturing
Variable Males Females Males Females
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Gross daily wage 1999 in e 100.00 26.649 84.681 26.403 103.878 23.750 86.449 25.832
Gross daily wage 2004 in e 113.531 37.363 91.931 37.566 118.318 34.105 94.656 38.085
Low wage in 1999 67.658 0 67.658 0 67.658 0 67.658 0
Low wage in 2004 71.883 0 71.883 0 71.883 0 71.883 0
Employment in 2004 0.829 0.376 0.665 0.472 0.859 0.348 0.691 0.462
Age 39.023 8.572 36.613 9.298 39.068 8.647 37.653 9.208
Low education 0.128 0.334 0.118 0.322 0.170 0.376 0.328 0.470
Higher secondary education 0.015 0.120 0.018 0.133 0.006 0.074 0.012 0.107
Vocational training 0.674 0.469 0.691 0.462 0.683 0.465 0.527 0.499
Vocational training + high 0.051 0.221 0.087 0.283 0.027 0.162 0.069 0.253
Technical college 0.036 0.186 0.020 0.141 0.061 0.239 0.026 0.158
University 0.096 0.295 0.066 0.248 0.054 0.225 0.039 0.193
Job tenure 107.775 87.340 89.971 78.872 140.005 91.621 120.280 88.082
Simple blue-collar occ. 0.046 0.210 0.023 0.151 0.371 0.483 0.372 0.483
Qualified blue-collar occ. 0.113 0.317 0.029 0.168 0.243 0.429 0.063 0.243
Technician and engineer 0.106 0.307 0.065 0.246 0.183 0.387 0.082 0.280
Service occupation 0.331 0.471 0.158 0.365 0.070 0.255 0.038 0.191
Clerical, administrative 0.319 0.466 0.554 0.497 0.104 0.306 0.420 0.493
Professional, manager 0.085 0.280 0.171 0.376 0.029 0.167 0.025 0.155
# Previous benefit spells 0.941 1.767 0.749 1.415 0.803 1.548 0.757 1.407
Regular employment before 0.478 0.500 0.388 0.488 0.377 0.485 0.305 0.461
current employment
Number of observations 71,037 35,773 362,420 77,726
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of individual characteristics. LIAB 1999
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Services Manufacturing
Variable Males Females Males Females
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Size < 100 0.068 0.252 0.082 0.274 0.019 0.136 0.021 0.142
100 ≤ S ize < 500 0.213 0.409 0.228 0.419 0.125 0.331 0.153 0.360
500 ≤ Size < 1000 0.143 0.350 0.185 0.388 0.144 0.351 0.169 0.374
1000 ≤ S ize < 5000 0.424 0.494 0.430 0.495 0.464 0.499 0.529 0.499
Size ≥ 5000 0.152 0.359 0.076 0.265 0.248 0.432 0.129 0.335
Industry-wide contract 0.706 0.456 0.707 0.455 0.901 0.299 0.876 0.330
Firm-specific contract 0.200 0.400 0.157 0.364 0.046 0.210 0.050 0.218
Works council 0.904 0.294 0.909 0.288 0.978 0.146 0.965 0.183
Mean Age 39.566 3.113 38.962 2.968 40.010 2.046 39.731 2.289
Share of high-skilled 0.095 0.130 0.105 0.125 0.096 0.087 0.100 0.092
Training share 0.378 0.413 0.337 0.385 0.346 0.280 0.360 0.319
Share of fixed-term contracts 0.053 0.093 0.055 0.078 0.039 0.042 0.042 0.053
Pos. employment growth 0.787 0.410 0.782 0.413 0.648 0.478 0.638 0.481
Manufacturing I 0 0 0 0 0.850 0.357 0.712 0.453
Manufacturing II 0 0 0 0 0.085 0.278 0.146 0.353
Manufacturing III 0 0 0 0 0.043 0.204 0.073 0.259
Construction 0 0 0 0 0.022 0.145 0.069 0.254
Wholesale and retail trade 0.199 0.399 0.263 0.440 0 0 0 0
Transport/communication 0.416 0.493 0.147 0.354 0 0 0 0
Financial intermediation 0.326 0.469 0.546 0.498 0 0 0 0
Other service activities 0.059 0.243 0.044 0.205 0 0 0 0
West Berlin 0.074 0.261 0.131 0.337 0.016 0.124 0.031 0.174
Schleswig Holstein 0.014 0.118 0.029 0.168 0.019 0.137 0.021 0.144
Hamburg 0.113 0.317 0.068 0.252 0.024 0.153 0.033 0.178
Lower Saxony 0.063 0.243 0.081 0.273 0.082 0.274 0.077 0.266
Bremen 0.065 0.247 0.022 0.146 0.012 0.109 0.010 0.100
North Rhine Westphalia 0.231 0.422 0.230 0.421 0.301 0.459 0.249 0.432
Hesse 0.174 0.379 0.109 0.312 0.065 0.246 0.074 0.262
Rhine-Palatinate 0.035 0.184 0.049 0.215 0.070 0.255 0.048 0.213
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.103 0.304 0.117 0.322 0.178 0.382 0.213 0.410
Bavaria 0.126 0.332 0.164 0.370 0.234 0.423 0.245 0.430
Number of observations 71,037 35,773 362,420 77,726
Table A2: Descriptive statistics of establishment characteristics. LIAB 1999
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Males Manufacturing
Wage in t-5 Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average prediction 0.439 0.005
Baseline 0.226 0.005
Explanatory variable in t-5 ME z -ratio ME z -ratio
Individual Characteristics
Age 0.022 1.27 0.000 0.23
Age squared -.000 -.89 0.000 0.46
Lower education 0.076
∗∗∗
2.60 0.005
∗∗∗
4.32
Higher sec. education -.067 -.85 -.002 -.69
Voc. training + high -.010 -.16 -.002 -1.13
Technical college 0.171 0.59 -.004
∗∗∗
-4.84
University 0.651
∗∗∗
7.72 -.004
∗∗∗
-6.21
Job tenure 0.002
∗
1.87 -.000 -0.55
Job tenure squared -.000 -1.62 0.000 0.41
Qualified blue-collar 0.005 0.18 -.001 -1.37
Technician and engineer -.030 -.44 -.004
∗∗∗
-9.89
Service occupation 0.013 0.50 0.001 1.15
Clerical, administrative -.059 -1.59 -.004
∗∗∗
-8.95
Professional, managers 0.048
∗∗∗
4.38 -.004
∗∗∗
-7.35
# Previous benefit spells -.002 -.36 0.000 0.52
Regular employment -.014 -.66 -.002
∗∗∗
-4.74
before current employment
Employer Characteristics
Size < 100 0.434
∗∗∗
2.69 0.036
∗∗
2.20
100 ≤ Size < 500 0.249 1.47 0.010∗∗ 2.05
500 ≤ Size < 1000 0.187 1.14 0.003 1.14
1000 ≤ Size < 5000 0.157 1.01 0.004∗ 1.93
Industry-wide contract -.071
∗∗
-2.00 -.004
∗∗∗
-5.22
Firm-specific contract -.033 -.61 -.003
∗∗
-2.38
Works council -.052 -1.25 0.000 0.15
Mean Age 0.017 1.41 0.000 0.42
Share of high-skilled -.013
∗
-1.86 -.000 -.51
Training share -.251
∗∗
-2.18 -.001 -.47
Manufacturing II 0.075 1.53 0.010
∗∗
2.16
Manufacturing III 0.149
∗∗∗
2.62 0.003 1.52
Construction 0.133 1.61 0.008
∗
1.66
ASD (GSD) 0.384 (0.209)
Number of observations 362,420
Note: See main text for description of the estimation method
and the definition of marginal effects. All specifications
additionally include regional and sectoral dummies.
Table A5: Estimation results for low pay transitions
of male workers in manufacturing
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Males
Manufacturing
χ2 p-value
A. Exclusion of Instruments
Instrument I from transition eq. 6.62 0.037
Instrument II from transition eq. 1.95 0.378
Instruments I and II from transition eq. 9.88 0.043
B. Inclusion of Instruments
Instrument I in retention eq. 8.16 0.004
Instrument II in initial condition eq. 4.71 0.030
Note: Instrument I denotes expected positive employment
growth and instrument II refers to the share of fixed-term
contracts.
Table A6: Diagnostic tests
Males
Manufacturing
Correlation Structure Estimate p-value
ρ1 (Initial conditions - retention) -.185 0.000
ρ2 (Retention - transition) -.044 0.811
ρ3 (Initial conditions - transition) -.207 0.182
Hypothesis Tests χ2 p-value
Exogeneity of initial conditions
H0 : ρ1 = ρ3 = 0 62.83 0.000
Exogeneity of retention
H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 62.01 0.000
Unobserved heterogeneity
H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 = 0 63.38 0.000
Table A7: Cross equation correlation structure
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